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STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Nature of the Case
Jeremy Guzman contends the district court violated his Fifth Amendment rights by
relinquishing jurisdiction based on the fact that he did not take a polygraph examination or
participate in a new psychosexual evaluation during the period of retained jurisdiction. This is
directly contrary to several recent decisions from the Idaho Supreme Court and Idaho Court of
Appeals. He also contends he was denied due process in this appeal because the district court
failed to maintain an adequate record below, as several documents presented in mitigation have
not been preserved.
None of the State's arguments in response really address that central issue. Rather, the
State tries to limit the scope of the Fifth Amendment right, or the ability to challenge the
violation thereof

However, the State's arguments are not consistent with the applicable

precedent, and in some cases, have already been rejected by Idaho's courts. As such, this Court
should reject the State's erroneous arguments and grant Mr. Guzman the appropriate relief The
same is true of the State's arguments on the due process issue.
For either reason, this Court should remand this case for further proceedings.

Statement of the Facts and Course of Proceedings
The statement of the facts and course of proceedings were previously articulated in
Mr. Guzman's Appellant's Brief

They need not be repeated in this Reply Brief, but are

incorporated herein by reference thereto.

1

ISSUES
I.

Whether the district court erred by relinquishing jurisdiction over Mr. Guzman based
solely on the fact that he did not participate in a new psychosexual evaluation and fulldisclosure polygraph examination during the period of retained jurisdiction.

II.

Whether the district court failed to preserve a sufficient record for appeal, thereby
depriving Mr. Guzman of his right to due process in this appeal.
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ARGUMENT
I.

The District Court Erred By Relinquishing Jurisdiction Over Mr. Guzman Based Solely On The
Fact That He Did Not Participate In A New Psychosexual Evaluation And Full-Disclosure
Polygraph Examination During The Period Of Retained Jurisdiction

A.

The District Court Was Arbitrarily Trying To Enforce An Insufficiently Specific And
Indefinite Order
The State's main argument on this issue is belied by the district court's own statements.

Specifically, the State asserts the district court was not trying to enforce the provision in the
order retaining jurisdiction, but rather, was commenting on the lack of additional information
about the risk Mr. Guzman would present if released on probation.

(Resp. Br., pp.27-28.)

However, at the relinquishment hearing, the district court made it clear that it was trying to
enforce the provision: "my order says I will not consider probation at the end of the period of
retained jurisdiction without a new full disclosure polygraph, new psychosexual evaluation."
(Tr., p.28, Ls.7-10 (emphasis added); accord R., p.69 (the "order" the district court was
reading).)

When defense counsel asked about the possibility of additional time to get that

evaluation conducted, the district repeated:
[H]ere's what's in my order: That I won't consider probation at the end of the
period of retained jurisdiction without a new full disclosure polygraph and a new
psychosexual evaluation. We're here for your retained jurisdiction review
hearing. I don't have those. Your report was authored on July 24th, so you've
had nearly a month that known that roughly when your hearing is going to be and
that it was time to get those things together, and as far as I can tell you don't have
them so that's my decision today.

(Tr., p.29, L.19 - p.30, L.5 (emphasis added); accord R., p.69.) Thus, by its own words, the
district court was expressly trying to enforce its "order." Given that context, the district court's
analysis regarding the lack of information about the risk to the community was all based on its

3

consideration of the fact that Mr. Guzman did not do what the district court "ordered" him to do.
As such, just as it did in Le Veque, the district court here was trying to enforce the provision in
the order retaining jurisdiction. Compare State v. Le Veque, 164 Idaho 110, 115-16 (2018). The
State's attempt to artificially segregate the district court's analysis in this regard is frivolous, as it
is belied by the transcript.
On the merits of this argument, the State does not counter Mr. Guzman's comparison of
the language of the provision at issue in this case with the language of the provision at issue in

Le Veque. Rather, it contends this provision should be held sufficiently specific because the
district court's statements at the hearing provided the clarity missing from the actual language of
the provision at issue. (Resp. Br., pp.28-29.) That is inconsistent with the Supreme Court's
analysis in Le Veque, which focused on the language of the provision to which the district court
kept referring, not on any statements the district court made in that regard at the relevant hearing.

See Le Veque, 164 Idaho at 115-16. In other words, if the district court wants to enforce an
order, the order itself must pass muster. 1 See id.; compare State v. Rogers, 143 Idaho 320, 322
(2006) (explaining that the district court not identified which specific rule the defendant had
violated or explain how he had acted improperly in that context. "Even though [the person's]
conduct may not have been fully in line with judicial policy, this is not sufficient reason to
impose sanctions.").

1

If the State's is correct that the district court's statements at the hearing resolve the
insufficiencies of the written provision, it only reinforces the conclusion that the district court
placed Mr. Guzman in the classic penalty scenario by conditioning his release on probation on
him waiving his rights and participating in the polygraph. (See Section I(B), infra.) Either way,
this Court should vacate the district court's decision in this case.
4

In this case, the relevant portion of the provision in question uses essentially the same
language as the provision in Le Veque. (See App. Br., pp.13-14.) As a result, it suffers from the
same defects as the provision in Le Veque.
The State's argument that this error was harmless uses the wrong standard in several
respects.

First, it improperly tries to flip the burden of proof onto Mr. Guzman. (See Resp.

Br., p.29.) Le Veque demonstrates that this sort of challenge is properly raised for the first time
on appeal, since there is no indication it was made to the district court in that case. See generally
Le Veque, 164 Idaho 110; see, e.g., State v. DuValt, 131 Idaho 550, 553 (1998) (explaining that,

"[ s] ince the issue was directly addressed by the trial court below, we will decide the issue on
appeal"). When issues are preserved for appeal, it is the State's burden on appeal to prove the
error harmless beyond a reasonable doubt. State v. Perry, 150 Idaho 209, 226 (2010).
Second, the State ignores the Idaho Supreme Court's explanation of the appellate court's
role when reviewing discretionary decisions like the one at issue here. "When the discretion
exercised by a trial court is affected by an error of law, the role of the appellate court is to note
the error made and remand the case for appropriate findings." Montgomery v. Montgomery,
147 Idaho 1, 6-7 (2009). This is because the district court is better situated to make those
findings - to weigh the relevant factors, and so, "[u]pon determination that a trial court abused its
discretion, the appellate remedy ordinarily is not to usurp the judge's authority by exercising
such discretion ourselves," which is essentially what the State is asking this Court to do.
H20 Environmental, Inc. v. Farm Supply Distributors, Inc., 164 Idaho 295, 300 (2018) (internal

quote omitted). Put another way, since this sort error demonstratably contributed to the decision
the district court reached, it cannot be said to be harmless beyond a reasonable doubt. Sullivan v.
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Louisiana, 508 U.S. 275,279 (1993); State v. Thomas, 157 Idaho 916, _ , 342 P.3d 628, 631-32
(2015).
Here, the district court's discretionary decision (to relinquish jurisdiction) was tainted by
an error of law (failing to realize that the provision at issue was not an enforceable order).
Compare Le Veque, 164 Idaho at 116-17. As such, this Court should, as the Supreme Court in
Le Veque did, note the error and remand the case for a proper determination before a different
judge because it was not harmless beyond a reasonable doubt. See id. at 117.

B.

The District Court Violated Mr. Guzman's Fifth Amendment Rights By Placing Him In
The Classic Penalty Scenario And Then Following Through On The Unconstitutional
Threat

1.

This issue is preserved and properly raised on appeal2

Idaho law is clear that the defendant may challenge errors in the district court's decisions
for the first time on appeal. See, e.g., In re Guardianship of Doe, 157 Idaho 750, 758 (2014)
("Once the court ruled, ... Guardians did not have to file a motion for reconsideration in order to
preserve the issue [a claim for attorney's fees following a sua sponte denial of fees entered by
the court] for appeal.") That is because, when the district court actually makes a ruling on a
particular point, that ruling is, itself, sufficient to preserve the issue for appeal. State v. Jeske,
164 Idaho 862, 868 (2019); DuValt, 131 Idaho at 553. This is particularly true when it comes to
sentencing decisions, such as the decision to relinquish jurisdiction because "the only point of
sentencing proceedings is to contest-absent express agreement-the sentence to be imposed."

2

The State's preservation argument is limited only to the Fifth Amendment issue. (See Resp.
Br., pp.12-13.) As such, even if this Court refuses to consider the Fifth Amendment issue in this
case, it should still consider his argument discussed in Section I(A), supra, about the vagueness
of the order. See Le Veque, 164 Idaho 110 (the Supreme Court considering that same question
for the first time on appeal).
6

State v. Clontz, 156 Idaho 787, 791 (Ct. App. 2014). Thus, the district court's analysis when

making sentencing decisions, such as deciding to relinquish jurisdiction, may be challenged for
the first time on appeal. Id.
Accordingly, in Van Komen, the Idaho Supreme Court considered precisely the same sort
of challenge that Mr. Guzman now makes despite the fact that he did not appear to have made an
objection when the district court announced its decision to relinquish jurisdiction. See generally
State v. Van Komen, 160 Idaho 534 (2016). As such, the State's argument - that Mr. Guzman's

challenge to the district court's analysis in its decision to relinquish jurisdiction needs to be
raised under the rubric of fundamental error (Resp. Br., pp.12-13) - is directly contrary to the
applicable precedent.
In fact, there was no point at which Mr. Guzman could have raised the Fifth Amendment
issue prior to the district court announcing its decision because, up until that point, there had
been no argument for relinquishment based on the lack of a new polygraph or PSE. The rider
staff had recommended probation. (PSI, p.84.) The prosecutor recommended relinquishment,
but for the reasons stated at the initial sentencing hearing, not because of the lack of a new
polygraph or PSE. (Tr., p.25, Ls.8-21.) As such, at the time Mr. Guzman's attorney made his
recommendation, there was nothing to challenge under the Fifth Amendment. 3

3

Trial judges are, of course, presumed to know the law, and therefore, are presumed to follow
the law. Bradbury v. Idaho Judicial Council, 149 Idaho 107, 117 (2009). At the time of the
rider review hearing, there were two published decisions on point which revealed the trial court
could not hold Mr. Guzman's silence against him in this regard, one of which was only five
months old. Van Komen, 160 Idaho 534; State v. Reed, 163 Idaho 681 (Ct. App. 2018). In
addition, there was the Court of Appeals decision in State v. Le Veque, 2017 WL 5560270 (Ct.
App. 2017), which had decided the same issue consistent with Van Komen and Reed, though
review had been granted, as well as the decision in State v. Powell, 161 Idaho 774 (Ct. App.
2017), which addressed a very similar situation based on the same principles used in Van Komen
and Reed. As such, there should have been no need for a preemptory argument in that respect.
7

More importantly, there was no mechanism by which Mr. Guzman could have
subsequently asked the district court to reconsider its decision on a Fifth Amendment basis.
Although Idaho Criminal Rule 35 ("Rule 35") allows for a defendant to request reconsideration
of a decision to relinquish jurisdiction, "the purpose of the extended jurisdiction under Rule 35 is
to allow the district court a limited time in which to determine whether a defendant's sentence is
unduly severe." State v. Knutsen, 138 Idaho 918, 922-23 (Ct. App. 2003); see also State v.
Huffman, 144 Idaho 201, 203 (2007) (holding that, in order to show a sentence is unduly severe,

the defendant must present new factual information (as opposed to new legal theories) which had
not yet been before the district court). In other words, I.C.R. 35 "'is not designed to re-examine
the facts underlying the case to determine whether a sentence is illegal; rather the rule only
applies to a narrow category of cases in which the sentence imposes a penalty that is simply not
authorized by law or where new evidence tends to show that the original sentence is excessive."'
State v. Wolfe, 158 Idaho 55, 65 (2015) (quoting State v. Clements, 148 Idaho 82, 86 (2009)). As

such, the Court of Appeals has expressly held that this sort of challenge to the decision to
relinquish jurisdiction - that it violated certain of the defendant's rights - could not be brought
under I.C.R. 35; rather, "the defendant must file an appeal" to make such an argument. 4
State v. Alvarado, 132 Idaho 248,249 (Ct. App. 1998).

The argument that the decision to relinquish jurisdiction violates the Fifth Amendment is
not an allegation that the decision to relinquish jurisdiction was not authorized by law. See
Le Veque, 164 Idaho at 114 (succinctly stating that, "[m]anifestly, the decision to revoke

4

To the extent I.C.R. 35(b) allows for a defendant to raise a challenge that the sentence was
imposed in an illegal manner, that is not applicable because the challenge Mr. Guzman raised
here is not to the imposition of the sentence. See, e.g., State v. Steelsmith, 153 Idaho 577, 581
(Ct. App. 2012) (reaffirming that a sentence is "imposed" when it is pronounced, not when the
district court relinquishes jurisdiction).
8

probation was within the bounds of its discretion," which means that decision is authorized by
law). Nor is it a claim that the sentences being executed were excessive in light of new factual
evidence. Therefore, it is not an argument which can properly be made in a Rule 35 motion. See

Wolfe, 158 Idaho at 65; Clements, 148 Idaho at 86; Huffman, 144 Idaho at 203. Rather, to raise
that claim, Mr. Guzman had to, and did, file an appeal. Alvarado, 132 Idaho at 249; compare

Van Komen, 160 Idaho 534 (considering this same sort of argument without any indication that it
was raised in an I.C.R. 35 motion first).
Since the State's fundamental error argument is inconsistent with all these cases, that
argument is meritless. 5

5

Should this Court decide to change Idaho law in this regard, and so, now require this sort of
argument to be raised under fundamental error if it was not made below, Mr. Guzman can satisfy
the test for fundamental error. See State v. Perry, 150 Idaho 209, 226 (2010); see also
State v. Miller, 164 Idaho 115 (2019). The district court's error violated his Fifth Amendment
rights. See Van Komen, 160 Idaho at 540. That violation is clear from the record, as the district
court repeatedly stated, much like in Van Komen, it was relinquishing jurisdiction because
Mr. Guzman had not followed its order and taken a new polygraph or psychosexual evaluation.
(E.g., Tr., p.29, L.19 - p.30, L.5.)
The record clearly shows defense counsel was not employing a strategy of not objecting,
as he was affirmatively arguing for probation. Compare State v. Easley, 156 Idaho 214, 221
(2014) (granting relief under the fundamental error standard when the record showed counsel
making arguments and objections for an alternative result on other grounds); see also Clontz, 156
Idaho at 791 (explaining that, absent an agreement, the point of a sentencing hearing is for the
parties to contest the sentencing decisions at issue).
The violation actually affected the outcome, and thus, prejudiced Mr. Guzman since,
instead of releasing him to probation, as the rider program staff recommended based on his good
performance and reduced risk to society, it decided to keep him in prison. See McKune v. Lile,
536 U.S. 24, 38 & 52 (2002) (indicating that a decision which results in the defendant being
incarcerated longer will be a penalty for Fifth Amendment purposes); Van Komen, 160 Idaho at
540 (actually holding the same).
9

2.

The district court considered Mr. Guzman's silence as the reason it felt it did not
have information about his risk to society (despite other evidence in the record
speaking to that fact), and that means its consideration of that issue is not an
independent basis to justify its decision

As the Court of Appeals recently reiterated: "There are limits to what information a court
may require of a defendant at sentencing for purposes of determining whether probation is
appropriate." Reed, 163 Idaho at 686 n.2. "A district court that demands irrelevant (at best) or
unconstitutional (at worst) explanations of a defendant or conditions of probation that are
irrelevant to the charge at hand or otherwise unconstitutional runs the risk of reversal for abusing
its discretion." Id. (emphasis added).

Thus, while protection of society is, indeed, a valid

consideration in determining whether to put a person on probation, the district court cannot
demand information relevant to that consideration in a manner that is, itself, unconstitutional.

Id.; see also Van Kamen, 160 Idaho at 540 (explaining that, while the district court could have
relinquished jurisdiction on other, proper bases, the fact that it actually considered an improper,
unconstitutional basis in its analysis meant the whole analysis was tainted and required reversal).
The State contends that the district court in this case could properly require Mr. Guzman
to produce that information based on the decision in State v. Jimenez, 160 Idaho 540 (2016).

(See Resp. Br., pp.14-18.) However, that misunderstands the ruling in Jimenez. In that case,
which was issued the same day as Van Kamen, the Supreme Court held the district court had not
violated the Fifth Amendment because it had made it clear that the fact that the defendant had
chosen not to participate in the polygraph "really played no factor in my sentence." Id. at 543
(emphasis in original). Rather, it explained, "I just have to deal with the case as what it is, and
not what it's not, and my discussion is based on the information I do have." Id. at 543 (emphasis
omitted). It was appropriate, given the information it had, to be concerned about the risk the
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defendant might present to the public if released on probation. 6 Id. As such, the district court in
that case was expressly not relying on the fact that the defendant chose not to talk to reach its
decision. Compare Van Kamen, 160 Idaho at 540.
The district court's words at the relinquishment hearing demonstrate that this case is
more like Van Kamen and Reed than Jimenez because they show the district court was actually
considering the fact that Mr. Guzman had not talked as a factor in its decision: "here's what's in
my order: That I won't consider probation at the end of the period of retained jurisdiction
without a new full disclosure polygraph and a new psychosexual evaluation. We're here for your
retained jurisdiction review hearing.

I don't have those."

(Tr., p.29, Ls.19-25 (emphasis

added).) Thus, where the decision in Jimenez was based on the lack of information which the
district court recognized it could not compel from the defendant, the decision in this case was
expressly based on the fact that Mr. Guzman had not spoken as the district court wanted him to.
This makes those two cases vastly different under the Fifth Amendment. Rather, like in Van
Kamen and Reed, the district court's words reveal it was considering Mr. Guzman's silence itself

against him, and that is unconstitutional.
Moreover, the record shows that, unlike the district court in Jimenez, the district court
here was not considering the case "as what it is." See Jimenez, 160 Idaho at 543. The district
court kept saying it could not know Mr. Guzman's risk to society without a new polygraph or
psychosexual evaluation, but that conspicuously ignores the fact that the rider staff included an
updated risk assessment of Mr. Guzman in the APSI.

6

That updated risk assessment put

Notably, Jimenez also did not involve the district court attempting to coerce the defendant into
waiving his rights when it retained jurisdiction. See generally Jimenez, 160 Idaho 540. As such,
the Fifth Amendment analysis between that case and this are also fundamentally different. (See
Section I(B)(3), infra.)
11

Mr. Guzman's "risk to reoffend statistically in the low risk range." 7
added).)

(PSI, p.88 (emphasis

This represented a significant reduction from the risk assessment at the time of

sentencing, which put him in the moderate range. (PSI, p.13.) Thus, the district court did have
new information about Mr. Guzman's risk to society. As such, the context from the whole
record reveals either that its concern was not so much with the risk to the public, but with the fact
that Mr. Guzman had not spoken in the way the district court wanted him to, or else, as discussed
in more detail in Section II, infra, that it failed to adequately consider all the relevant information
in the record.
Thus, the district court here did precisely the opposite of what the district court did in
Jimenez.

Rather, the district court's actual words reveal that it was engaging in the same

erroneous consideration it had used in Van Kamen. As in Van Kamen, that should result in
remand for new sentencing before a new judge.

3.

According to the United States Supreme Court, the classic penalty scenario is in
play even when the defendant does not give in to the attempt to coerce him to talk

The United States Supreme Court clearly explained that the classic penalty scenario is in
play whenever there is coercion through an explicit or implicit threat that silence will be
punished which "foreclose[s] a free choice to remain silent." Minnesota v. Murphy, 465 U.S.
420, 437 (1984).

The violation of the Fifth Amendment exists at that moment and taints

everything thereafter.

See id. (explaining the classic penalty situation arises is when "the

7

The State refers to a subsequent PSE evaluation that Mr. Guzman presented with his ensuing
motion for leniency under I.C.R. 35 to argue that Mr. Guzman's risk was low-moderate. (Resp.
Br., p.30.) However, the district court's sentencing decision is based on the information
available to it at the relinquishment hearing. See State v. Huffman, 144 Idaho 201, 203 (2007)
(making it clear the reason I.C.R. 35 motions are evaluated separately on appeal is precisely
because they present information which the district court could not have considered at the initial
sentencing hearing). As such, it is improper for the State to argue the district court's decision
was proper based on information that did not exist at the time of the relinquishment hearing.
12

state ... sought to induce him to forgo the Fifth Amendment privileged by threating to impose
economic or other sanctions capable of forcing the self-incrimination which the Amendment
forbids."); United States v. Von Behren, 822 F.3d 1139, 1151 (10th Cir. 2016) ("A witness is
compelled under the Fifth Amendment as soon as the government threatens him with a
substantial penalty-it makes no difference whether he proceeds with answering or stands on his
right.") (emphasis from original); compare State v. Powell, 161 Idaho 774, 781 (Ct. App. 2017)
(holding that telling a potential parolee that his failure to answer questions would result in the
denial of his parole was enough to create the classic penalty scenario).
As such, it does not matter, as the State seems to believe, whether the defendant
succumbs to the threat or not. (See Resp. Br., pp.19-25 (arguing that, because Mr. Guzman did
not succumb to the district court's threat and actually make incriminating statements, the classic
penalty scenario does not apply).)

Once the impermissible threat is made, the Fifth

Amendment's protections become self-executing. See, e.g., Powell, 161 Idaho at 780 (quoting
Murphy, 465 U.S. at 435) (explaining that, while the Fifth Amendment is usually not selfexecuting, "[t]he result may be different if the questions put to the probation, however relevant to
his probationary status, call for answers that would incriminate him in a pending or later criminal
prosecution") ( emphasis added)).
As such, once the threat is made, it does not matter whether the defendant expressly
invokes the Fifth Amendment's protections or not because "[t]he general rule that the privilege
must be claimed when self-incrimination is threatened has also been deemed inapplicable in
cases where the assertion of the privilege is penalized so as to foreclose a free choice to remain
silent and compel incriminating testimony." Murphy, 465 U.S. at 434 (internal quotation and
alterations omitted). As a result, in either scenario, the Fifth Amendment protections are self-
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executing, which means the government cannot follow through on the threat when "the attempt
to override the witnesses' privilege proved unsuccessful" without violating those protections.
See id.; compare Le Veque, 2017 WL 5560270, **6-7 (evaluating this precise question and

reaching this same conclusion). 8
Ultimately, this result is a function of the fundamental principles of the Fifth Amendment
- that it "as broad as the mischief against which it seeks to guard." Estelle v. Smith, 451 U.S.
454, 458 (1981) (internal quotation omitted). Since it is improper under the Fifth Amendment
for the district court to threaten to continue a defendant's incarceration if he does not talk, there
must be a remedy under the Fifth Amendment for when that happens, regardless of whether or
not the defendant thereafter succumbs to that threat.

4.

There was a risk that the new polygraph could lead to self-incrimination

The State contends that, because Mr. Guzman had already taken one polygraph in this
case, there was no risk of self-incrimination in the district court's order for a new polygraph.
(Resp. Br., pp.26-27.) That is mistaken. The district court wanted the new evaluation to reassess
Mr. Guzman's risk to society if released. There is no requirement that the new evaluation ask
identical questions to the prior evaluation. For example, the new evaluator could decide to
follow up on certain answers that the prior evaluator let lie, and the answers to any number of

8

The Court of Appeals' decision in Le Veque is provided here as a historical example of how a
learned court has addressed this issue since the Idaho Supreme Court did not contradict the Court
of Appeals' analysis in that regard on review. See generally Le Veque, 164 Idaho 110; see also
Staff of Idaho Real Estate Comm 'n v. Nordling, 135 Idaho 630, 634 (2001) (quoting
Bourgeois v. Murphy, 119 Idaho 611, 617 (1991)) ("When this Court had cause to consider
unpublished opinions from other jurisdictions because an appellant had discussed the cases in his
petition, we found the presentation of the unpublished opinions as 'quite appropriat[ e].'
Likewise, we find the hearing officer's consideration of the unpublished opinion, not as binding
precedent but as an example, was appropriate.").
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such questions would carry the risk of self-incrimination. See Van Kamen, 160 Idaho at 538;
Estrada v. State, 143 Idaho 558, 564 (2006).

As such, even though the new evaluation would have been aimed at the same general
subject matter, that does not mean the new evaluation did not carry the risk of self-incrimination.
As such, the demand for the new evaluation was still unconstitutional despite the prior
polygraph. Compare Le Veque, 2017 WL 5560270 (explaining why there would be still be a
violation of the Fifth Amendment in almost the same circumstances - where the defendant had
already participated in other polygraphs relating to the same issues on prior occasions).

5.

Under the proper standard, the State has failed to carry its burden to show this
error was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt

As discussed in Section I(A), supra, the State's harmless error argument is based on an
improper standard in several respects. It improperly attempts to flip the burden of proof It also
ignores the Supreme Court's discussion of the role of appellate courts when discretionary
decisions are affected by an error oflaw. Finally, it does not acknowledge the actual standard
for harmless error - whether the error contributed to the decision made. For all these reasons,
the State's harmless error argument should be rejected.
Under the proper standard, the State has failed to carry its burden to prove the error
harmless beyond a reasonable doubt.

Since the district court expressly, but erroneously,

considered Mr. Guzman's silence as a factor in reaching its decision, that error contributed to the
decision rendered. The State does not address this consideration. Instead, it improperly asks this
Court to find the error in the decision to relinquish jurisdiction based on a comment Mr. Guzman
made with respect to his subsequent I.C.R. 35 motion. (See Resp. Br., p.30.) As discussed in
note 7, supra, the determination of whether the district court abused its discretion in
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relinquishing jurisdiction is based on the information and recommendations that were actually
before the district court at the time it made that decision. Therefore, the State's attempt to justify
the district court's decision based on a fact that was not in existence at the time the district court
made that decision is improper.
Finally, Mr. Guzman would also like to argue that there was a reasonable possibility that
a district court, one not considering Mr. Guzman's silence against him, would have placed him
on probation given all the information presented to it at the relinquishment hearing - the rider
staffs recommendation and the letters of support presented at that time. Unfortunately, the
district court failed to maintain copies of the letters of support, and so, failed to maintain an
adequate record for review on that point. (See Section II, infra.) As such, even if this Court is
inclined to adopt the State's harmless error argument on this issue, that would only prove the due
process violation, and so, this case should still be remanded on that basis.

II.
The District Court Failed To Preserve A Sufficient Record For Appeal, Thereby Depriving
Mr. Guzman Of His Right To Due Process In This Appeal
The State argues there is no due process violation because the prejudice Mr. Guzman
identified in this regard - his ability to make an argument that the district court failed to
sufficiently consider the mitigating factors in deciding to relinquish jurisdiction -it is not based
on his Fifth Amendment claim discussed in Section I(B).

(Resp. Br., p.34 ("The letters of

support that Guzman claims are missing from the appellate record are wholly irrelevant to
Guzman's argument that the district court violated his Fifth Amendment privilege against
compelled self-incrimination.... That is, the prejudice does not involve an argument Guzman
has actually made ... ").) The State has completely misunderstood this issue. This is a wholly
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separate issue from his assertion that the trial court violated his Fifth Amendment rights. This is
a claim that he has been denied a meaningful opportunity to be heard on appeal, and thus,
deprived of due process. See, e.g., State v. Strand, 137 Idaho 457,462 (2002).
In order to show the due process error, Mr. Guzman has to identify the argument that he
has been prevented from meaningfully making. See, e.g., State v. Hensley, 145 Idaho 852, 858
(2008) (holding that, where the record showed no reference to the missing item at the relevant
point in the proceedings, "Hensely was unable to show that the [missing item] was necessary to
prosecute or pursue this appeal," and so, there was no due process violation), abrogated on other

grounds.

To meet this burden, Mr. Guzman explained the argument he would like to make is

that the district court failed to sufficiently consider all the mitigating information in determining
that relinquishment was appropriate. (See App. Br., pp.17-18.) One of the alternative remedies
he requested, so that he can meaningfully make that argument on appeal, was that this Court
presume the missing letters supported his recommendation from probation, and based on that,
vacate the district court's decision to relinquish jurisdiction because it was an abuse of
discretion, in that it did not sufficiently consider all the relevant information in reaching its
decision.

(App. Br., p.21.)

Thus, the State's assertion that this issue is related only to a

hypothetical argument is a mischaracterization of his arguments on appeal. 9

(See Resp.

Br., p.35.) The error here has affected the process to make that argument in a more traditional
sense. It is this that actually demonstrates how Mr. Guzman's due process rights were violated
by the lack of a complete record.

9

In fact, as indicated in Section I(B)(5), supra, the due process violation has become even more
apparent because it is affecting Mr. Guzman's ability to meaningfully make arguments m
response to the State's contention that the Fifth Amendment violation was harmless.
17

Finally, the State contends that, even presuming the letters demonstrate Mr. Guzman was
a good candidate for probation, this Court should still affirm the decision to relinquish
jurisdiction. However, that is actually inconsistent with the State's prior argument - that the
district court's focus was on the lack of information about the risk Mr. Guzman would present to
society. Presuming the letters demonstrate Mr. Guzman was a good candidate for probation,
they would directly address that concern, as would the rider staffs evaluation that Mr. Guzman
was a low risk to reoffend after completing the rider program. Therefore, the district court's
conclusion -

that probation was improper because it could not adequately evaluate

Mr. Guzman's risk to society - expressly shows it failed to consider all the information in the
record.

That, the Supreme Court has held, shows an abuse of discretion in the sentencing

decision. State v. Knighton, 143 Idaho 318, 320 (2006).

CONCLUSION
Mr. Guzman respectfully requests this Court vacate the order relinquishing jurisdiction
and remand this case for further proceedings in front of a new district court judge.
DATED this 6th day ofDecember, 2019.

/s/ Brian R. Dickson
BRIAN R. DICKSON
Deputy State Appellate Public Defender
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